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Abstract 
Despite estimates that the global butterfly trade generates over US$100 
million annually in sales of pupae for exhibitions and deadstock for a 
range of collector and artisanal uses, almost no research has been 
conducted that unpacks the dynamics of these value chains. This paper 
remedies this gap by highlighting the governance structure of the value 
chain, with important implications on the benefits for chain 
participants, upgrading strategies, sectoral sustainability, and the 
potential for new market entrants. Our research on live butterfly chains 
reveals the fragility of current modes of economic organization that 
promote overproduction as threatening the long-term viability for the 
industry as a whole. We propose an alternative governance model 
based on the use of individually transferrable quotas, or ITQs, as a 
means of improving the performance of certain butterfly value chains. 
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 Introduction 
Butterflies are one of nature’s most charismatic and recognized species. 
Their beauty is highlighted in a variety of contexts, ranging from 
established exhibitions in North America, and Europe, and Asia, 
mounted displays for collectors, their use in a variety of artisanal 
designs, and their ubiquity in advertising and marketing campaigns for 
a diversity of consumer products. A rather dated study by Parsons 
(1992), and reiterated in a recent review by Boppré and Vane-Wright 
(2012), estimated that the global market value of products generated 
by the butterfly sector exceeded US$100 million. However, virtually no 
research has attempted to systematically validate this figure, and the 
economics of the butterfly sector, for all of its diversity, remains 
thoroughly under-researched. 
One of the important contributions of the commercialized butterfly 
sector, particularly the trade in live butterflies, is through its linking of 
conservation and livelihoods opportunities in the developing world. 
Monetizing or creating value from products associated with natural 
resources such as forests is one means of aligning incentives between 
different stakeholders to both take joint ownership of forest 
conservation and to realize the value of the forest in generating other 
forms of economic activity. Butterfly farming has played an important 
role in this manner. Over the past twenty-five years, a number of 
butterfly farms in tropical parts of Central and South America, East 
Africa, and Southeast Asia, have been established to supply exhibitions 
in North America and Europe with live pupae, which then hatch and 
emerge as butterflies for a period of up to several weeks. These butterfly 
farms necessarily maintain an important symbiosis with their natural 
environment, as the conservation of forest resources is critical as a 
supply of host plants to breed butterflies in captivity and to ensure 
genetic diversity of breeding stock. Studies by Gordon and Ayiemba 
(2003) and Morgan-Brown (2007) noted the positive benefits on the 
conservation of forest resources and perceptions about the 
environment among butterfly farmers due to butterfly farming in Kenya 
and Tanzania, respectively. From a livelihoods standpoint, butterfly 
farming can also help create new full-time and part-time employment 
opportunities and generate income-generating activities in remote 
areas where such opportunities are limited at best. Scurrah-Ehrhat and 
Blomley (2006) found that butterfly farming generated an additional 
17 percent to the income of project participants in the Amani project in 
Tanzania, while Gordon and Ayiemba (2003) noted that the top earner 
from the Kipepeo butterfly project in Kenya was a disabled man that 
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could easily embrace butterfly farming as a livelihood activity more 
suitable for his condition.1 
As noted above, the economics of the butterfly sector remained 
under-researched, particularly outside specific cases evaluating the 
establishment of butterfly farms. A particular gap is an analysis of the 
butterfly sector through the lens of its value chains, in terms of 
characterizing the actors and modes of economic organization that 
underpin economic activities and their linkages with conservation and 
the environment. The latter point is particularly salient as to whether 
(and how) butterfly farming can be “scaled up” and highlighted as a 
model of sustainable development or whether there are lessons for 
other, related activities that link conservation with livelihoods. Boppré 
and Vane-Wright (2012), in their recent review of the butterfly sector, 
focused primarily on distribution routes, but did not characterize the 
governance of the value chain either locally or globally. Procházková 
and Rich (2011) recently looked at different global butterfly value 
chains based on available secondary data, including a preliminary 
assessment of governance and distributional benefits from partici-
pation, though their analysis was incomplete based on limited 
published or grey literature.  
This paper builds on earlier works by providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the local and global value chains for live butterflies. In-
depth primary field interviews with farmers and other stakeholders in 
Europe, East Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America allowed the 
authors to fill in the gaps from past analyses, especially from the 
standpoint of trade flows and modes of economic organization. Our 
analysis pays close attention to the governance structures, defined as 
the coordination and transactions mechanisms, implicit within the 
butterfly value chain (Kaplinsky 2000; Gereffi et al. 2005). In 
particular, we find that value chains for live butterflies are fragile and 
threatened by a combination of recent market shocks and poor 
governance. The industry is replete with significant oversupply of 
pupae and stagnant demand from exhibitions, which has been 
exacerbated by recent EU regulations that prohibit the transport of 
pupae without obtaining a costly veterinary certificate. This has 
resulted in a consolidation of buyers in Europe and squeezed out 
smaller suppliers that cannot ship in bulk to reduce the unit costs 
associated with the new inspection regulations. Moreover, the 
oversupply of pupae, particularly in Africa, manifests itself from 
governance structures that promote scaling out of production capacity 
rather than coordinating the output of producers directly with existing 
demand. The high inventory found among African producers, who 
often cannot sell much of their stock at various times of the year, 
                                                          
1  Fieldwork in 2012 revealed that one of the top earners at Kipepeo is a disabled man with 
one leg, and elephantitis in the remaining leg, and who earned several hundred U.S. 
dollars per month. 
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discourages participation and weakens coordination, particularly in the 
face of adverse market shocks.  
In the absence of tight, relational forms of governance or pure 
vertical coordination, we suggest a role for ITQs, first conceived as a 
means to manage fisheries stocks, as a means to overcome the 
governance failures existing within most butterfly value chains and to 
smooth inventories at the producer level. 
 An overview of the market for live 
butterflies 
The market for live butterflies for exhibition originated in the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s on the island of Guernsey, spurred by the need 
to generate alternative revenue from infrastructure built for the tomato 
industry that had previously crashed (Procházková and Rich 2011). A 
boom/bust cycle followed in the United Kingdom during the 1980s, 
with the establishment of additional butterfly houses, some of which 
are attached to zoos, in Europe and North America over the past twenty 
to thirty years (Boppré and Vane-Wright 2012). Today, there are 
several thousand butterfly houses and gardens of various sizes 
throughout the world, with Boppré and Vane-Wright (2012) estimating 
some 40 million visitors to these per year.  
The supply of live tropical butterflies to Europe and North America 
(the regions with the largest butterfly houses) comes from three main 
sources: Central and South America, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. 
Figure 1 illustrates the volumes of these flows in peak periods of the 
year based on informant interviews with producers in supplying 
regions and buyers in Europe and North America and (where possible) 
published trade volumes. Southeast Asia, mainly the Philippines and 
Malaysia, is the largest supplying region of pupae, accounting for 
between 50-70 percent of pupae for butterfly houses. The appeal of 
Southeast Asian butterflies is primarily price – pupae at wholesale in 
Europe typically retail for less than US$1 per pupae for common 
species; prices at the producer level are less than US$0.50. Central and 
South American exports are about 30-40 percent of pupae in butterfly 
exhibitions and include popular species such as the Blue Morpho. 
Pupae from Central and South America tend to retail at a premium over 
Asian butterflies, with F.O.B. export prices per pupae in the range of 
US$1.50-2.00. African butterflies, chiefly from Kenya and Tanzania, 
are no more than about 10 percent of the market and retail at prices 
similar (and sometimes higher) to Latin American species. Some 
butterfly farms and buyers have established long-standing supply links 
based on trust and reliability of supply. Seasonality is a key 
characteristic of the live butterfly trade. Many butterfly houses in 
Europe and North America are only open from March-November, with 
demand for pupae falling considerably during the winter months.  
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Figure 1. An overview of trade patterns in the live butterfly market 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on fieldwork and interviews, 
July 2012-February 2013. 
An increasingly problematic trend for the industry is that prices for 
butterflies have remained static in nominal terms, while the costs of 
production, ranging from shipping costs, materials, and labor, have 
risen precipitously. Indeed, in some cases, the prices for pupa have 
fallen in nominal terms, despite a steady increase in the admission 
prices of the exhibitions that house imported butterflies. An important 
future need in the production side of the sector will be to improve 
technology, although this has potential equity concerns, as many 
smallholder producers are unable to afford such cost-saving 
technologies (personal communication, Feb. 2014). 
An important development in the live butterfly trade concerns 
changes in shipping carriage to the European Union (EU). Before 2009, 
many butterfly suppliers would typically transport live pupae via DHL, 
FedEx, or other courier services that provided economical transport for 
small volumes of pupae (100-200 pupae). However, recent legislation 
has classified butterflies as “live animals,” necessitating a veterinary 
certificate and veterinary check to get them into the EU, at a cost of 
approximately £160/shipment to the UK (personal communication, 
Oct. 2012). The effect of this has been to make smaller shipments from 
marginal suppliers in Asia and Africa (e.g., Sri Lanka, Madagascar, 
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Uganda) not cost-effective. For larger suppliers in East Africa, transport 
costs to Europe have increased by a factor of four, necessitating the 
bundling of shipments from Kenya and Tanzania (personal 
communication, July 2012). With this change in shipment rules has 
come a significant consolidation of buyers within Europe – Stratford 
Butterfly Farm has taken market share from smaller buyers and now 
maintains a dominant share in brokering trade between tropical 
suppliers and buyers in European butterfly exhibitions. 
 Governance structures of live 
butterfly value chains 
In this section, we focus more in depth on the value chains themselves 
for live butterflies, focusing in particular on governance structures. 
Governance in this context is defined as the key actors and mechanisms 
used that coordinate and lead activities and processes within the value 
chain (Kaplinsky 2000). Gerreffi et al. (2005) have developed different 
typologies of governance based on the complexity of transactions, 
codification of knowledge, and capabilities of actors within the value 
chain. These can range from diffuse, arms-length market based forms 
of governance, in which the main coordinating mechanism is price, to 
vertical integration, whereby a single firm owns and manages activities 
within the value chain itself. As value chain governance moves from 
the market-oriented to more hierarchal forms, there is necessarily a 
movement towards greater coordination on quality, volumes traded, 
and investments between value chain actors to facilitate transactions 
(Wever et al. 2012). 
In order to motivate the governance structures present in the live 
butterfly trade, we first need to characterize the linkages and 
relationships present within the value chain through a mapping of 
different value chains for live butterflies. We expand the analysis found 
in Procházková and Rich (2011) by identifying three main types of 
value chains present in the live butterfly trade market. In all cases, 
downstream sales to foreign buyers are basically the same from each 
type of supply base and described subsequently. Figure 2 illustrates 
each of these chains graphically. 
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Figure 2. Value chains for live butterflies based on different governance 
mechanisms 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on fieldwork and interviews, 
July 2012-February 2013 
 
The first type of governance structure observed in the live butterfly 
market is a vertical integration model. In these cases, production is 
either centralized in one relatively large farm or a number of farms that 
are directly owned by a central organization. Examples of this model 
include production in El Salvador, Ecuador, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. Volumes of production are coordinated directly by the 
central organization or farm owner based on orders given by foreign 
buyers. In those organizations with multiple farm sites, the managers 
of different butterfly farms are employees of the larger organization. 
These governance structures tend to be more corporate in fashion, 
though single-owner farms as present in Ecuador and El Salvador 
combine their business with a socially and environmentally 
responsible component. 
In other cases, the coordination of production is more atomistic, 
relying on the coordination between independent butterfly farms of 
Karl M. Rich, Magda Rich and P.G. Chengappa 
 
12 
various sizes and a central organization or NGO project that buys from 
farmers and manages trade with foreign buyers. We can distinguish 
between two different forms of this type of model. One model relies 
heavily on what Gereffi et al. (2005) characterize as relational forms of 
governance, in which complex forms of interactions and mutual 
dependence arise based on reputation, repeated interaction, or 
family/ethnic ties bind parties together. Probably the best (and perhaps 
only) example of this is the Costa Rica Entomological Society (CRES). 
CRES works with a network of roughly 90 farmers who have developed 
long-term relationships with CRES and where such interactions have 
helped to foster an expertise and knowledge of the market among 
CRES’s entire network of farmers that is unique within the sector. 
Access to this network is tightly controlled, with CRES working to 
maximize returns given to its farmers. Consequently, farmers working 
with CRES generally receive higher prices than other butterfly farmers 
in Costa Rica (personal communications, Oct. 2012).  
The other model of organization is what Gereffi et al. (2005) term as 
captive governance, where smaller suppliers rely heavily on larger 
buyers to coordinate trade. In this model, present in other parts of 
Costa Rica and particularly in East Africa, companies, NGOs, or 
development projects have established networks of small butterfly 
farms that supply these organizations with pupa for export. Farmers in 
these networks are captive in the sense that they typically receive the 
highest price for pupa from the organizer, though in some cases (e.g., 
Kenya), farmers often sell outside of the network albeit at a discount.  
A particular problem in the captive model of governance is that 
supply is often poorly coordinated relative to demand, leading to 
oversupply of pupa and discouraged suppliers. The terms of farm sales 
illustrate some of these issues. For instance, one of the larger projects 
in Tanzania aims to provide farmers with 65 percent of the export price, 
but often only buys one-half of the supply offered to the project 
(Morgan-Brown 2006; personal communications, July 2012). As 
exports are around 1,000 pupa per week, the rejection of an additional 
1,000 pupa, valued at US$1 each, suggests the opportunity cost of the 
rejections is over US$50,000 per year. By contrast, another project in 
Tanzania contracts to buy all pupa from farmers, with export rejections 
placed in its butterfly exhibition (personal communications, July 
2012). While this reduces risks for farmers, it merely shifts these to 
buyers to find markets for all purchased butterflies, whether for export 
or through local tourism (e.g., local butterfly gardens), as well as the 
cashflow required for sustaining such types of purchases. In both 
Kenya and Tanzania, while farm networks for local buyers are 
extensive, only a few farmers are consistently active in the trade, with 
many farmers only involved on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, little in the 
way of market information is provided to farmers, leaving them quite 
vulnerable to changes in market conditions. Indeed, the largest project 
in Tanzania saw its base of farmers fall by nearly two-thirds after the 
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airfreight issue emerged in 2010 (personal communications, July 
2012). An additional issue is that many butterfly projects that began as 
NGOs or development projects have organizational difficulties in 
making the transition to being a for-profit business and institutional-
izing decision-making processes (personal communications, July 
2012).  
From these different supply bases, sales of pupa are made to one of 
two different channels in Europe or the United States. In general, large 
brokers handle the majority of sales (recall figure 1). The two main 
brokers in the butterfly trade are LPS in the United States and Stratford 
Butterfly Farm in the UK. These brokers assemble pupa shipments from 
throughout the world and send pupa to different exhibitions in the 
United States and Europe. Typically, shipments made to exhibitions are 
a mix of Asian (50 percent), Near Tropics (35-40 percent), and African 
(10-15 percent), with sales made on a weekly or bi-weekly basis 
depending on the size of the order (personal communication, Oct. 
2012). Most sales from Africa, Ecuador, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Suriname, and Belize are handled via brokers. In El Salvador, about 
half of sales are made directly, while the rest are handled via brokers. A 
few suppliers, most notably CRES, send pupa directly to exhibitions, 
while a minority of sales are handled by smaller brokers, mainly sales 
from Latin America to Europe (personal communications, October 
2012 and November 2012). 
As noted earlier, the change in freight rules has resulted in a 
significant consolidation in the market, with many smaller brokers 
leaving the market (personal communications, October 2012). There 
was some concern expressed among interviewed suppliers about the 
consolidation in buyers, although one of the East African suppliers 
remarked on the continued patience that Stratford has had with quality 
and distribution from East Africa to Europe (personal communication, 
July 2012). 
 
 Challenges for the global butterfly 
trade 
The global butterfly trade is in a tenuous state of stasis. At present, 
global supply for export and demand are roughly balanced. The 
shipping crisis of 2010 led to a number of smaller suppliers in South 
Asia and Africa exiting the market and reaffirming the dominance of 
larger players in East Asia and Central America that can more cost-
effectively provide large volumes to European and American 
exhibitions. On the demand side, there has been relatively weak growth 
in the number of global exhibitions over the past few years, particularly 
due to the financial crisis, though prospects for the future exist in the 
Middle East, Russia, and China (personal communication, February 
2013). In East Africa, there is hope for a new exhibition in Mombasa to 
serve as a possible display hub and market for East Africa butterflies 
(personal communication, July 2012). Nonetheless, given that existing 
suppliers could meet new demand easily, the prospects for new players 
in the sector are limited. Indeed, countries like India, which does not 
allow the export of any of its fauna at present, would be hard pressed to 
compete with suppliers in the Philippines on price and species 
diversity, while other countries such as Peru, which dominates the 
deadstock market, does not offer species that are that unique relative to 
other Latin American suppliers (personal communication, October 
2012). While niches for certain species do exist, in general, new 
entrants will have to meet buyer demands that butterflies are “big, 
pretty, cheap, easy to maintain, and common” (personal 
communication, October 2012). Conversely, any niches that could 
emerge are likely too small and limited in scope relative to existing 
supplies. The potential for new, conservation-based projects based on 
butterfly farming in the future is likely to be limited given current 
governance patterns. On the margin, and at local levels, an expansion 
of butterfly farming could have some positive impacts, particularly 
those farms linked with local tourism, though the range of beneficiaries 
is likely to be small. On the other hand, those oriented exclusively 
towards export markets are much less likely to be viable, even if 
demand rises significantly, unless they can provide something 
significantly different than existing offerings. As many species do not 
breed well in captivity, the universe from which should new, niche 
supply could come from is likely to be limited.  
A more pressing issue in the current construct of the industry 
concerns the management of butterfly production in the captive 
governance model found predominately in East Africa but also in many 
NGO and development-led butterfly farming projects. As noted earlier, 
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the organization of these models fails to adequately equip farmers with 
information on external conditions and demand, with farmers largely 
producing what they can and hoping to sell as much as possible, rather 
than closely working with farmers and mentoring their skills and 
production capacity in a more sustainable manner. Many of these 
development projects are often designed to be scalable, involving many 
farmers and communities, and thus making it difficult to restrict the 
number of participating farmers for a host of equity reasons. In the 
absence of developing a relational governance model such as the one 
found at CRES, which takes considerable effort and social capital to 
develop, such projects could potentially be better managed by 
implementing market-based incentives for the production and trade of 
butterflies between farmers and buyers. 
One such way this could be done is through an instrument known as 
an individually transferable quota, or ITQ, conceived as a means to 
control open-access resources such as fisheries (Gordon 1954; Scott 
1955). ITQs are similar to methods proposed in the environmental 
economics literature to control pollution (e.g., “cap-and-trade” 
policies), relying on the development of property rights and markets to 
internalize the externality associated with the right to pollute (Crocker 
1966; Dales 1968; Montgomery 1971). ITQs are different than some 
types of production quotas found in many agricultural commodities 
(see e.g. Babcock 1990; Dawson 1991; or Colman 2000), in the sense 
that quota rights can be traded, with the aim to commoditize 
production rights as a means to limit overproduction (McCay 2004). 
ITQs have been successfully implemented in many fisheries to arrest 
the decline of wild stocks. Chu (2009) found improvements from the 
use of ITQs in 12 of 20 the stocks studied. In a meta-review of over 
11,000 fisheries, Costello et al. (2008) found that ITQs more often 
reversed trends of stock decline relative to other forms of management. 
They further noted that proportion of ITQ-managed fisheries that 
collapsed was one-half the proportion of those not using ITQs.  
Under an ITQ system, each year an annual quota of fish is 
established, with individual fishermen given a share of the quota based 
on past production (Aranson 1990; Grafton et al. 2006). However, it is 
possible to allocate ITQs by other means, such as through auctions or 
by community-based approaches (Wingard 2000). Trade is allowed, 
with quota-holders provided the right to trade their production rights to 
those that wish to increase production. Consequently, ITQs remove the 
“commons” problem associated with overfishing by creating a market 
for the right to fish (Aranson 1990; Sumalia 2010). At the same time, 
while ITQs can improve the management of fisheries, there can also be 
equity issues to resolve. In particular, ITQs can lead to consolidation of 
production and greater market power for larger producers at the 
expense of smaller ones (Grafton et al. 1996; Sumalia 2010). Some of 
these types of problems can be resolved through different mechanisms 
to allocate quota rights, whether through communities, auctions, or 
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limiting the size of individual quota rights that can be obtained 
(Sumalia 2010; Wingard 2000). There can also be problems with 
“highgrading” in which lower valued fish that are caught are thrown 
back at sea, with only high-valued fish caught and applied towards the 
quota and thus putting pressure on the viability of the natural stock of 
certain species (Anderson 1994).  
How could ITQs be adapted in small-scale butterfly farms? Butterfly 
production is different than fisheries in the sense that overproduction 
would not deplete natural stocks of butterflies. However, one of the 
major challenges in butterfly production is relatively constant demand 
with increasing numbers of potential suppliers, particularly in those 
butterfly farms in Africa that involve hundreds of farmers in their 
systems. A quota system that allocated production rights to 
participating producers and allowed smaller farmers the right to earn 
money through the trading of quota rights could not only reduce losses 
and overproduction, but could also improve the stability of income for 
all involved in the sector. Rich (2014), adapting an ITQ model of 
Garrity (2011), highlights these positive dynamics in a simulation 
model of smallholder butterfly farming, and demonstrates different 
means by which quotas could be allocated in more equitable ways.
 Conclusions 
Over the past thirty years, butterfly farming has proved to be a unique 
vehicle for enhancing the preservation of the environment and 
biodiversity. By giving butterflies a monetary value and establishing a 
vibrant international market for their trade and display, butterfly 
farming has notably improved the management of local forests in many 
developing countries and given livelihoods opportunities to the poor, 
of which many of whom would be unable to find other opportunities in 
their communities. At the same time, the market for butterflies is 
rapidly maturing, with opportunities for new entrants relatively 
limited, particularly on the export side. Moreover, existing production, 
particularly that which is smallholder based, could be enhanced 
through institutional innovations that would tighten the governance 
and coordination of these systems. By highlighting and distinguishing 
between the governance mechanisms that exist within this under-
researched sector, our paper has provided guidance on current 
constraints and mechanisms through which such improvements could 
be realized. 
While we are somewhat skeptical on the potential for increased 
butterfly farming for export, we do see particular scope for expanding 
the mechanism of monetizing and valuing butterflies more generally as 
a means of protecting the environment. We mention two ways in 
particular. First, the expansion of butterfly gardens at a local level 
could further raise public awareness for conservation and provide 
opportunities for a range of disadvantaged groups (see Rich et al. 2014 
for an example of this). In many developing countries, general 
awareness of environmental protection is low. Butterfly gardens are a 
relatively low-cost way of communicating the need for conservation 
and target younger generations that are more likely to uptake this 
message. Furthermore, as with butterfly farming, butterfly gardens can 
employ vulnerable members of society in developing countries, such as 
the disabled, giving them both a livelihoods as well as an important 
role as an environmental steward. 
Second, integrating butterflies and their conservation within 
traditional agricultural production practices or as a side activity (e.g. 
butterfly gardens) could be a way for various types of producers to both 
add value to production, whether through branding or local tourism for 
example, while simultaneously serving as stewards for the 
environment. Producer-led eco-labeling programs that highlight the 
protection of local biodiversity could be one means to elicit consumer 
response by environmentally conscious segments of society that care 
about specific species (Chengappa et al. 2014). As the presence of 
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butterflies in an ecosystem represents a useful, low-cost signal of a 
healthy environment, their use as both a performance measure and 
symbol that communicates to consumers the conservation efforts made 
by producers, and could be utilized as a means to add value to 
producers engaged in sustainable production practices. In this fashion, 
we could consider the use of butterflies or other types of biodiversity 
promotion as a new, private sector led means of payments for 
environmental services, or PES (Pagiola 2008). While current PES 
provides an incentive mechanism for producers to adopt more 
sustainable land use and production practices, communicating these 
practices to consumers and other actors in the value chain can be 
problematic and threaten the positive efforts made by producers. 
Furthermore, PES programs are overwhelmingly funded by government 
or donor organizations, with sustainable private sector led funding 
mechanisms largely absent (Milder et al. 2010). In this context, linking 
PES with financial and communication mechanisms that add value for 
producers, and shift the burden of payment from government to 
consumers who are willing to pay for such goods, could be a more 
sustainable way of valuing butterflies in the future. 
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